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We analyze the demand of the Euromillions lottery tickets, a European 
lotto-like game launched in 2004 and played simultaneously in nine 
countries with the same rules and the same draws. Using the effective price 
methodology, we show that price elasticities are very different across 
countries. Especially, Spain and Portugal exhibit a low price elasticity and 
high mean sales, meaning a low sensitivity to jackpot increases. On the 
contrary, Ireland and the United Kingdom exhibit very high long-run 
elasticities and a large sensitivity to jackpot variations. The interpretations 
of these results are linked to lower GDP in the two former countries and, for 
Spain, to the large development of syndication play, and to the bookmaking 
activities and the highly competitive betting market in Ireland and the UK. 
Moreover, we show that Spanish and Portuguese players pay a much higher 
effective price than UK gamblers, meaning that in a certain sense the former 
subsidize the latter. 
Keywords: lottery, gambling, demand estimation, price elasticity 
JEL classification: D81, H71 2 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
    States and private firms offer a large variety of legalized games of 
chance, but lotto-like games are among the most popular for at least for two 
reasons. They are easy to play, players having only to select 5, 6 or 7 
numbers in a range varying from 35 to 55, depending on the country and the 
precise design of the game. They also offer large (and attracting) jackpots, 
due to the long odds they are based on, and consolation prizes as well. 
Lottos are also interesting to study because they are based on the pari 
mutuel principle. A given percentage of sales returns to players, the rest 
feeding the budget of the organizing state or being used to finance good 
causes. It implies that prizes depend on the number of tickets played and so 
does the expected value of a ticket. Especially, when the jackpot increases, 
sales are boosted but the probability of sharing the jackpot also increases. 
Consequently, the expected value of a ticket is closely linked to the buying 
behavior of players. 
    Euromillions is one such lotto-like game, launched in February 2004 in 
three european countries, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In 
October 2004, six other countries joined in, namely Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal and Switzerland. Euromillions is 
characterized by very long odds, since there is only one chance over about 
76 millions to win the jackpot. It is probably one of the lotteries with the 
longest odds throughout the world. 
    As mentioned by Cook and Clotfelter (1993), "there is a strong tendency 
for per capita lotto sales to increase with the size of the population base". It 
may explain why low population countries like Luxemburg or Ireland have 
been interested in joining the three initial countries. Moreover, enlarging the 
population base may avoid jackpot fatigue (Matheson and Grote, 2004) 
which arises when many successive draws bring no winner. The jackpot is 
then perceived as almost impossible to win and sales may start to decrease. 3 
 
The probability of getting a winner then diminishes and it can put at stake 
the survival of the game. 
    In general, very long odds generate rollovers which have two conflicting 
effects. On one side, a larger jackpot is offered after a rollover, but, on the 
other side, this larger prize attracts (apart from the abovementioned jackpot 
fatigue effect) a greater number of players. As a consequence, the 
probability of sharing the higher jackpot with other winners increases, then 
lowering the individual expected jackpot prize. 
    The demand of lotto tickets is usually estimated as a function of the 
effective price which is the difference between the cost of a ticket and its 
expected value. The cost is known and generally stable through time but the 
expected value varies from draw to draw for at least two reasons. The first 
one is the possibility of rollovers which increases the expected value and 
then decreases the effective price. The second reason, not independent from 
the first, is that the effective price depends on the volume of sales by the 
role it plays on the probability of a rollover. Estimating a demand function 
must take into account these two conflicting effects which are highly non 
linear. 
    These remarks show that the estimation of the demand of Euromillions 
tickets is interesting in itself due to the very long odds of the game implying 
frequent rollovers. For exemple, 67.9% of draws didn't bring any jackpot 
winner between February 2004 and September 2008 (239 weekly draws). 
Even if we restrict the period by starting in October 2004 (when the six new 
countries joined in) the percentage is still 66.66%. Moreover, two sequences 
of twelve draws in a row without any jackpot winner have been observed 
during this period. 
    The other interesting feature of the Euromillions lottery is its international 
character since it is played in nine countries. Players face the same rules, the 
same rollovers, but live in diverse environments. The competitor games are 
different (lottos, instant games, etc.), some countries allow bookmaking 4 
 
activities while others do not, per capita GDP may be quite different from a 
country to another, and so on. 
    In this paper, we analyze the demand for tickets in two steps. We start by 
an aggregate-level study including all the participating countries. The 
methodology is quite standard and uses the effective price approach. Then, 
using the effective prices estimated in the first step, we compare the demand 
functions of the nine countries and show that behaviors are very different 
across countries. Especially, we show that UK players are much more 
sensitive to jackpot increases (corresponding to effective price decreases) 
than players of the eight other countries. On the contrary, in Spain and 
Portugal, players are less sensitive to jackpot changes. A link with per capita 
GDP and the level of sales is proposed to explain this maybe 
counterintuitive result. 
    The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the rules of 
the game and the database used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 deals 
with the estimation model and section 4 develops the empirical results and 
their interpretations at the aggregate level. Section 5 provides a country-by-
country analysis of sales and price elasticities. Finally, section 6 concludes 
the paper and proposes some future directions of research. 
II. Rules of the game and database 
II.1 The rules of the Euromillions lottery 
    The essential differences between a standard national lotto game and 
Euromillions are the following. First, numbers are drawn in two different 
sets. Five numbers are drawn without replacement in the range {1,...,50} 
and two more numbers are drawn (independently of the first five) in the 
range {1,9} without replacement. These two numbers are usually called 
"lucky stars", by reference to the European flag. So players notch seven 
numbers, five in the first set and two in the second set. Most standard lotto 
games are based on draws of five or six numbers in a set of 35 to 53 
numbers. 5 
 
    The Euromillions lottery offers twelve winning ranks defined in table 1. 
For example, the notation n + m means that n numbers are correct in the first 
set and m in the second set. The column "%prize" reports the way the prize 
pool is shared among the winning ranks at the end of the sample period. In 
fact, these figures were changed twice since the start of the game. The 
proportion devoted to the first rank was initially 20% of the prize pool. It 
increased to 22% in August 2004 and reached the current level, 32%, in 
February 2006. The sharing of the prize pool is not unusual. In most lotto 
games, the part devoted to the jackpot (rank 1) is generally large, as is the 
proportion devoted to the low rank prizes. However, the reasons are 
different. A high jackpot rate makes the game attractive and a high share 
devoted to low rank prizes avoids too low (and discouraging) gains for these 
ranks, since the number of the corresponding winners is high. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
    The second important difference with national lotto games is that 
Euromillions is played in nine different countries with a unique draw and 
uniquely determined prizes for all the participating countries. It means that 
all players face the same takeout rate, the same draws and rollovers and 
almost the same cost. The cost of a ticket is 2 euros for the Euro-zone, 1.5£ 
for UK and 3.2 Swiss francs for Switzerland. As tickets and prizes are 
obviously paid in local currency, we will neglect the evolution of exchange 
rates in our analysis. Consequently, all amounts considered in the rest of the 
paper are written in euros. It is the most natural choice because the takeout 
rate is exactly 50%, therefore the amount devoted to prizes is equal to the 
number of tickets sold (in the absence of rollovers). 
    It can be observed, in table 1, that the sum of the percentages (in column 
%prize) is not 100% but only 94%. It comes from the existence of a "reserve 
fund" used to feed some jackpots. Usually, when a jackpot has been won, 6 
 
the next week jackpot is a round amount, in general 15 millions
1
    The database for the Euromillions lottery has been built through the 
website www.sojah.com which is the French official website related to all 
the state-sponsored games of chance in France. It not only provides the 
. Then, a 
volume of sales of 46 million tickets would be necessary to feed a 15 
million jackpot prize without using the reserve fund and the typical sales 
level is lower than that. 
    When a jackpot is not hit (rollover), the next one is fed with the amount 
that has not been won (32% of the amount of last week prize pool) plus a 
part of the reserve fund. The anticipated amount of the next jackpot 
(announced jackpot) is used by the organizers in TV, radio or press ads. 
    Exceptional events are sometimes proposed to players. In these occasions, 
a huge jackpot is offered, even if it is not the result of successive rollovers. 
As we will see later on, it happened twice in our sample period (100 and 
130 millions respectively). Obviously, these events necessitate a specific 
treatment in the demand estimation process. 
    To sum up, Euromillions is a well-suited lottery to perform international 
comparisons because many variables are controlled. The takeout rate is 
constant across countries for a given draw and has been constant through 
time since the inception of the game. All the participants face the same 
draws and rollover amounts and, more generally, the same rules. It is not the 
case in most international comparisons (for example Garrett (2001)) of 
lottery gambling. Consequently, if differences occur in the demand 
functions, they cannot come from the design of the game and may be 
attributed to behavioral or environmental features. 
II.2 The data 
                                                 
1 At the beginning of the game, only 3 countries were participating and some jackpots were 
only 10 millions. 
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history of draws and individual gains but also all the laws
2
    - the percentage of sales devoted to each rank
 concerning these 
games. Moreover, for the Euromillions lottery, it also provides the draw-by-
draw results of the other participating countries. 
    We extracted the data for the first 197 draws, starting at the beginning of 
the game on 02/13/2004 and ending on 11/16/2007. We mentioned in the 
introduction that six  countries joined in after the first 34 draws. 
Consequently, we decided to start our empirical study in October 2004, 
giving up not 34 but 35 draws, to avoid the biases induced by the entry day 
of the six new countries. 162 draws were then considered for the empirical 
analysis, starting on 10/15/2004. 
    For the present study, we use the following elements: 
    - the volume of sales, country by country and at the aggregate level; 
    - the individual gains for each rank; 
    - the number of winners for each rank in each participating country; 
    - the realized jackpot (to be shared among first-ranked winners); 
3
                                                 
2 Especially it makes available all the laws about the regulation of the games published in 
the "Journal Officiel de la République Française”. 
3 It changed only once in our sample period, the part of the jackpot price increasing from 
22% to 32%. This change was compensated by a decrease in the portion devoted to the 
reserve fund, from 16% to 6%. 
. 
    In fact, 4 countries realize about 80 % of the total volume of sales, 
France, England, Spain and Portugal. It is interesting to notice that the first 
three totalize around 150 millions of inhabitants and Portugal only 11 
millions, but the mean number of tickets sold in Portugal is comparable to 
the corresponding figures in France or Spain with a  4 to 6 times lower 
population and it is twice the volume of sales in the UK. 
II.3 Descriptive statistics 8 
 
    Table  2  presents descriptive statistics concerning the main variables 
entering the demand estimation process, namely, the weekly level of sales, 
the anticipated jackpot (whose calculation is detailed in the next section) 
and the jackpot as it is provided in the database. In columns 2 and 3, we 
added the populations of the nine countries and the per capita GDP
4
    The two lowest per capita GDP correspond to the two lowest coefficients 
of variation, namely Spain and Portugal. Knowing that time-variations in 
sales are essentially due to rollovers and increasing jackpots, one possible 
interpretation is that players in low GDP countries are less sensitive to 
jackpot increases. This remark may seem counterintuitive but it is worth to 
remember that "lowest" jackpots are 15 millions which is already a huge 
amount for low GDP players. For example, the per capita GDP in Portugal 
is half the one in Ireland and the mean sales per inhabitant are three times 
higher in Portugal. This interpretation is consistent with cumulative prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) in 
which the valuation of a risky prospect is realized with respect to a reference 
 
    Concerning the lottery-related variables, we report the minimum (Min), 
maximum (Max), mean (μ), standard deviation (σ) and coefficient of 
variation (μ/σ). As mentioned before, the range of variation of the three 
variables is large and essentially due to rollovers. 
Table 2 around here 
    Several elements deserve comments in Table 2, especially the situations 
of Portugal, the United Kingdom and Luxemburg. Portugal is characterized 
by a high mean-sales level, in particular regarding its population base, and a 
low coefficient of variation around .38 (the coefficient of Spain is even 
lower). On the contrary, the United Kingdom is remarkable with a "low" 
mean sales level (still with respect to the population base) and a very high 
coefficient of variation. 
                                                 
4 2006 figures in USD provided by the Conference Board and the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm 
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point. The valuation function is concave for gains and convex for losses. 
Agents characterized by a low reference point (linked to per capita GDP) 
find little marginal utility in jackpot increases, taking into account that the 
initial jackpot (if won) leads the "low GDP" winner in a zone with 
negligible marginal utility. 
    Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of sales in Portugal, Spain, UK and 
Europe as a function of the jackpot in two sequences of twelve draws in a 
row without jackpot winners. The initial levels of sales, that is sales in the 
first week without a rollover (15 millions jackpot), have been normalized to 
1. It appears clearly that the Spanish and Portuguese curves are below the 
mean (corresponding to Europe) and the UK curve is far higher, showing a 
much greater sensitivity to jackpot increases in the UK. One possible 
interpretation is the highly competitive UK lottery market. For example, 
there were 680 authorized bookmakers in the UK in 2006, according to the 
report of the NJPC (National Joint Pitch Council). When the jackpot 
increases and the effective price decreases, Euromillions becomes more 
competitive and may attract players who usually bet on other lotteries, on 
racetrack or other sports through the bookmaker network (Forrest et al., 
2008). 
Figure 1 around here 
Figure 2 around here 
    Finally, Luxemburg also deserves a special comment. As can be seen on 
table  2, the per capita GDP is exceptionnally high, about 3 times the 
Portuguese one and 50% higher than the second highest, Ireland. This figure 
has to be regarded with prudence because thousand people work in 
Luxemburg (in banks and insurance companies) without living there. Most 
often, they come from France, Belgium and Germany. It also means that it 
is impossible to identify the origin of lottery sales. It is possible that a non 
negligible part comes from these cross-border employees. 
 10 
 
III The estimation of the demand for Euromillions tickets 
III.1 Model specification 
 
    The most common way to estimate sales in lotto-like games relies on the 
standard economic approach linking demand to price. However, the cost of 
a ticket is very stable through time and is not a good measure of the price, 
simply because there is an expected return from a lotto ticket. Consequently, 
most papers estimate demand through its link to the effective price, defined 
as the cost of the ticket minus its expected gross return (Gulley and Scott 
(1993), Scott and Gulley (1995), Walker (1998), Farrell et al.  (1999), 
Forrest  et al.  (2001), Forrest et al.  (2002), Wang et al.  (2006) among 
others). 
    The two main factors determining the effective price are the expected 
volume of sales and possible rollovers which increase the jackpot and 
decrease the price. Obviously, other factors may influence demand, like 
income or demographic considerations but, on the short run, these elements 
cannot justify the variations observed on figure 3. This figure shows the 
draw-by-draw evolution of ticket sales for the Euromillions lottery between 
October, 15, 2004 and November, 16, 2007 (162 draws). Huge variations 
are observed, either progressively in a few weeks, when several rollovers 
occur in a row, or suddenly, when an exceptional jackpot is offered. It is the 
case in two occasions corresponding to draws 122 (02/09/2007) and 155 
(09/28/2007) on figure 3 (the corresponding points are circled). In the first 
case the exceptional jackpot is 100 millions and it is 130 millions in the 
other case. 
 
Figure 3 around here 
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    The time-series of sales is typical for a lotto-like game (see for example 
Farrell et al., 1999, Gulley and Scott, 1993, Purfield and Waldron, 1999 or 
Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2001). Successive rollovers generate large 
increases in sales and the curve is convex on the subsets of dates 
corresponding to such a sequence of rollovers (see figures 1  and  2  as 
examples  of this phenomenon). Apart from the rollover effect, we also 
observe a positive trend on sales because the sample starts a few months 
after the inception of the game. The number of tickets sold starts from 20 
millions and slowly increases to 40 millions 
    Figure  4  shows, on the same period, the evolution of the jackpot. It 
appears clearly that the peaks in sales correspond to large increases in 
jackpots due to rollovers or to the two exceptional events (also circled on 
figure  4). In fact, the correlation between the two variables on our 
estimation period is 0.89. 
 
Figure 4 around here 
 
 
    But the increase in sales due to rollovers implicitly lowers the probability 
of a rollover in the next draw. Consequently, it is rather intuitive that the 
amount of the rollover is an essential determinant of the effective price; 
moreover, there is no takeout rate on the rollover amount. 
    The pari mutuel feature of lotto games make the estimation of demand 
interesting in itself because demand depends on the effective price which 
itself depends on demand (ticket sales). The problem is usually solved in a 
two-stage procedure. First, demand is estimated as a function of variables 
like the announced jackpot, a possible trend in sales, and some dummy 
variables related to exceptional events like superdraws (draws with an 
exceptional jackpot not coming from successive rollovers) or changes in the 12 
 
design of the game. This first estimation is used to calculate an effective 
price which is then injected in the second stage of the estimation procedure. 
    As mentioned before, the effective price is the difference between the 
cost of a ticket and its expected value. The expected value for draw t is 
written as: 
t t tt AV p JA ES K = ×× +         (1) 
 where p is the probability of winning the jackpot,  t JA  is the amount of the 
date-t jackpot,  t ES  is the portion of the jackpot a given winner will keep 
and  t K  is the expected value of smaller prizes. We neglect the fact that 
rollovers may happen at lower ranks and we assume that  t K  is equal to .62 
euro, the part of gains devoted to ranks 2 to 12. Nevertheless, we have to 
mention that a rollover at rank 2 happens 7 times on the 162 draws of our 
estimation period, essentially in the beginning. But when a draw brings no 
winner at rank 2, the gains are reported on the following rank of the same 
draw. Consequently our simplifying assumption is innocuous. 
    Another exception deserves to be noticed. From  November 2005 to 
February 2006, 12 draws in a row didn't bring any jackpot winner. The 
jackpot finally reached 183 millions and 3 winners shared it. After this 
sequence, the organizers decided, probably to avoid jackpot fatigue, that in 
case of 12 rollovers in a row, the jackpot would be shared by second-rank 
winners. It happened once, on November, 17, 2006. 
    Cook and Clotfelter (1990) remarked that the Poisson distribution is 
adequate to model the probability of getting a winning ticket. It allows to 
write  t AV  as follows: 
[ ]( ) 1
1
(1 ) 1 (1 )
t pQ
t t tt tt
t




−  = +− − +−      (2) 
c is the cost of the ticket, τ is the takeout rate,  t Q  is the number of tickets 
sold by date t,  1 t R −   is the cumulated rollover from previous drawings,  t β  is 13 
 
the share of the prize pool devoted to the jackpot and  t α   is the share 
devoted to smaller prizes (see table 1). On the period of our empirical study, 
t α  is constant equal to 62%. It is worth to notice that  t β  rose from 22% to 
32% of the prize pool in February 2006. However, the difference of 10 % 
was not taken on the share of smaller prizes ( t α ) but on the Reserve Fund 
which was fed by 16% of the prize pool before the change and 6% after. 
Consequently,  1 tt αβ +< . 
    As mentioned before,  t Q  is not known in equation 2. The first stage of 
the process estimates  t Q  with variables already known before date t. If we 
denote by  t I  the information possessed at date t, the first-stage is devoted to 
the estimation of 
*
1 t tt Q EQI − =   . 
    Our model is close to the one proposed by Forrest et al. (2002). We use 
the following general formulation: 
( )
*
1 , , ,, , , t tt t t t t Q f CONSTANT TREND Q JA EVENT HALO SHARE − =   (3) 
where EVENT is a dummy variable taking into account the 2 exceptional 
jackpots in the database. TREND is simply the number of the draw to take 
into account a possible trend in sales. SHARE  is a variable taking into 
account the change in the percentage devoted to the jackpot during our 
sample period. It takes two values, respectively 22% and 32% and is then 
equivalent to a dummy variable. Finally, HALO is a dummy variable aimed 
at taking into account a possible halo effect. It is sometimes observed that 
after a large jackpot has been won, sales remain important on the next draw 
(Farrell et al., 1999, Grote and Matheson, 2007). In other words, there is a 
lag in the sales adjustment to the new jackpot level. 
    The presence of  1 t Q −  in equation 3 doesn't mean that we focus on the 
time-series properties of sales. In fact, the role of this variable is to take into 
account the fact that small prize winners on a given draw often reinvest their 
gains in the purchase of tickets for the next draw. Therefore,  1 t Q −  could be 14 
 
replaced by a "small gain" variable, say the amount of gains at ranks 11 and 
12. However, this amount is strictly proportional to  1 t Q −   since the 
percentage of the prize pool devoted to these ranks is constant since the 
inception of the game. It also explains why, in the next section, we will use 
OLS to estimate equation 4 hereafter (see Walker and Young, 2001). 
 
III.2 The first-stage equation 
To estimate t AV , we first perform the following regression (Model I): 
*2




Q a a t a Q a JA a JA
a EVENT a HALO a SHARE ε
− =++ + +
+ ++ +
    (4) 
The introduction of the variable "jackpot squared" is justified by the convex 
relationship between sales and jackpot amount usually observed (Forrest et 
al., 2002, Wang et al. 2006). Beenstock and Haitowsky (2001) used log-
sales and log-prizes in their regression but nevertheless introduced the 
square of the logarithm of the jackpot amount in their regression. 
    To estimate the coefficients, we need the announced jackpot  t JA . But the 
one reported in the database is either the announced jackpot, when there is 
no winner, or the realized jackpot where there are one or several winners. In 
the latter case, it may be different of the jackpot really announced before the 
draw. Therefore, we cannot directly use these figures in the estimation since 
they are not always known before the draw. We have to estimate  the 
anticipated date-t jackpot with variables in the information set  1 t I − . 
    If there are some winners at t - 1, we can keep the jackpot provided in the 
database for date t. It is usually a rounded amount, typically 15 millions. 
When there is a rollover, we assume that sales are expected to be the same 
as in the preceding draw and we take into account the percentage devoted to 
the reserve fund to feed the new jackpot. It is an approximation because the 
organizer uses this fund in a strategic way. More precisely, when the jackpot 
is "low", all the amount devoted to the fund in a given draw is added to the 15 
 
next jackpot. But after several rollovers, only a part (unknown before the 
draw) of the fund is added to the next jackpot. It implies that our estimation 
is very precise for low and mean jackpots but is a little bit optimistic for 
high ones, even if our estimation of sales is conservative. Figure 5 illustrates 
this point for a sequence of 12 draws in a row without winners. It compares 
the jackpot provided in the database (the dashed line JR) with our 
calculations (the bold line JA). 
 
Figure 5 around here 
 
   
The variable HALO is defined in the following way. When the draw t - 1 
brings some winners and the corresponding jackpot includes rollovers of 
preceding draws, HALO = 1. In the other cases, HALO = 0. To take into 
account the difference between the two exceptional jackpots, EVENT takes 
the value of the announced jackpot for the two dates corresponding to the 
exceptional jackpots and 0 elsewhere. 
    After having estimated the coefficients in equation 4, we reintroduce the 
estimated values 
*
t Q  in equation 2 to calculate the anticipated value of the 
game  t AV . The effective price is then equal to  tt P c AV = −  with c = 2 €. 
 
III.3 The second-stage equation 
 
    The second stage of the estimation process links sales to the effective 
price obtained in the first-stage by means of the equation: 
01 2 1 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) t t t tt Q t Q P LEVENT βββ β β ε − =++ + + +    (5) 
    This formulation using logarithms for lagged sales, exceptional jackpots 
and prices allows to directly interpret β₃ as the short-run price elasticity of 16 
 
ticket sales. The long-run price elasticity is  represented by β₃/(1-β₂). 
Equation 5 is comparable to the one used by Forrest et al. (2002) and Wang 
et al. (2006), apart from the fact that we do not need to distinguish between 
Wednesday and Saturday draws since there is only one Euromillions weekly 
draw. Here LEVENT is the logarithm of EVENT when EVENT is strictly 
positive and 0 elsewhere. 
 
IV. Empirical results at the aggregate level 
IV.1 First-stage estimation 
    Equation 4 contains  1 t Q − , therefore the estimation is performed on 161 
draws starting on 10/22/2004. Table 3 summarizes the results. Not to deal 
with too large numbers, the variable, 
2
t JA  has been divided by 10⁸. 
Table 3 around here       
    Six out of eight coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level. The only 
two unsignificant coefficients correspond to the variables SHARE  and 
HALO. It is in fact not surprising. The date-t announced jackpot includes the 
part devoted to the reserve fund at date t - 1. Moreover, the change from 
22% to 32% of the jackpot share was operated by diminishing the reserve 
fund. Consequently, the modification of SHARE is already included in  t JA . 
Concerning the variable HALO, Grote and Matheson (2007) remark that the 
halo effect corresponds to successive draws with decreasing sales and 
increasing jackpots. It appears only 5 times in our sample period, explaining 
that the halo effect is not large enough for the coefficient of HALO to be 
significant. 
    The adjusted R² is equal to 0.966 and the F-statistic is 640.75, the two 
being obviously largely significant. 
 
IV.2 Second-stage estimation 17 
 
    As  presented in the preceding section, the equation estimated in the 
second-stage is: 
01 2 1 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) t t t tt Q t Q P LEVENT βββ β β ε − =++ + + +    (6) 
In this equation, the values of LEVENT are either 0 or ln( ) t JA  for the two 
exceptional jackpots, to take into account the difference between the amount 
of these two jackpots. The results appear in table 4. All the coefficicents are 
highly significant and we are first going to focus on the short-run price 
elasticity which is equal to -0.609 with a t-value of -28.637. The 
significance of this coefficient clearly indicates a downward sloping demand 
curve as it was expected. Ceteris paribus, a decrease of 1% of the effective 
price generates an increase of 0.611% of sales. However, the usual caveat 
ceteris paribus is restrictive because a decrease of 1% in the effective price 
on a given draw has long-term effects (since lagged sales enter equation 5 
with a highly significant coefficient). Consequently, the long-run price 
elasticity has to be measured by β₃/(1-β₂). It is then equal to -0.896. This 
result is in line with the one obtained by Forrest and McHale (2007) in their 
analysis of the competition between the Euromillions lottery and the UK 
lotto.  The maximization of sales by the organizer implies a long-run 
elasticity of -1. At a first glance, we could say that the level of sales is not 
maximized and that the effective price could be increased. We have to be 
prudent when referring to such an interpretation for two reasons. The first is 
obvious and concerns rollovers. Variations in the effective price essentially 
come from rollovers and it is not clear if a permanent increase in the 
effective price (by means of a takeout rate increase for example) would 
generate a decrease in sales corresponding to the long-run elasticity 
provided by the model. The second reason is more subtile. The long-run 
elasticity provided by the model concerns aggregate (European) data and is 
obtained by regressing the logarithm of global sales on the logarithm of the 
effective price. However, the big picture can hide large disparities across 
countries. Figures 1 and 2, shown in section 2, were signals of the maybe 
important behavioral differences across countries. 18 
 
 
Table 4 around here 
    It is the reason why, in the next section, we reestimate equation 5 country 
by country. 
V. International comparison 
    To reveal behavioral peculiarities in Euromillions gambling, equation 5 is 
estimated nine times, considering national sales levels as  the  dependent 
variables. It is important to notice that the effective price is the same in all 
countries because all players face the same conditions before a given draw 
(in terms of jackpot and winning probabilities) but the time series  t Q  are 
different from a country to another. Consequently, coefficients β₂ and β₃ 
may vary depending on the behavior of national players. The essential 
results are reported in table 5. The model performs well in all countries and 
almost all the coefficients have the same significance level than in the 
aggregate analysis. The two exceptions are the coefficients of EVENT in 
Portugal and the United Kingdom which are significant at the 5% and 1% 
levels respectively, instead of 0.1% in the aggregate model. 
Table 5 around here 
    There are large differences in coefficients β₂ and β₃ across countries. The 
influence of lagged sales is much more pronounced in Ireland and the UK 
and lead to high long-run elasticities (in absolute value). The comparison 
between UK and Spain is especially interesting. UK players have strong 
reactions to jackpot increases, leading to a high short-run elasticity. Due to 
the difference between coefficients of  1 t Q −   for the two countries, the 
difference between long-run elasticities is even higher.  However, as 
explained in a stimulating paper by Garvia (2007), Spain is a specific case 
due to the development of syndication play. This development is due to 19 
 













 and to 
the existence of the Christmas lottery which is a really important event in 
Spain. For this special lottery, 90 % of gamblers are syndicate players. 
Garvia shows that  syndicates have  become a  common  habit in  Spain. 
Obviously, it is then not surprising that Spanish players are less sensitive to 
changes in the jackpot  level since it is easier to always play the same 
amount for the members of a syndicate, especially if there are many 
members. 
These national peculiarities show that the interpretation of long-run 
elasticity at the aggregate level can lead to questionable conclusions about 
the optimal level of the ticket price or of the takeout rate. It is simply due to 








= ∑  where 
k
t Q  stands for 
sales in country k at draw t. For example, consider a draw in which sales 
reach their mean level (of the three-year period under consideration) in each 
country, and assume the price has been increased by 1% through a change in 
the takeout rate. The short-run change in sales would be a decrease of 
0.579%, according to the national elasticities, but 0.611% if we consider the 
aggregate coefficient. Using long-run elasticities, the decrease would be 
0.93% with national elasticities but only 0.9% when using the coefficient 
obtained with aggregate data. 
To conclude this empirical analysis, we illustrate the effect of the 
differences in elasticities by calculating the mean effective price paid by 
players in each country over the sample period. As UK players are highly 
sensitive to a jackpot increase, we can expect that they are “late comers” in 
the game. In other words, they start to play heavily at high jackpot levels 
when the effective price is low. Table 6 illustrates this point. We observe 
that the mean effective price paid by UK players is only 0.785 € (or the 
                                                 
5 The abolition of the Spanish lotto in 1861 and the reform of the Loteria Nacional 
increased the cost of gambling, then provoking the take off of syndicates among the 
working classes. It then became a usual social practice among all social categories. 20 
 
equivalent in Sterling pounds) when the corresponding price paid by 
Spanish players is 0.928 €, that is more than 15% higher. 
The third and fourth columns show the mean share of gains and tickets and 
the fifth is the ratio gains/tickets. We could expect that UK players generate 
a better return since they pay a lower mean effective price. It is in fact not 
the case on our sample period; the ratio is 0.992 for Spain and only 0.978 
for the UK. It is not so surprising because the relationship between the 
realized number of jackpot winners and the number of tickets is non linear. 
The linearity only prevails for expectations. As the number of jackpot 
winners is in general very low, large differences appear between realized 
and expected numbers of winners. This phenomenon is also illustrated by 
the fact that low population countries exhibit extreme ratios, only depending 
on the presence of jackpot winners. For example, the ratio of Ireland is 
extremely high (1.53) only because an Irish woman was the only winner of 
a 115 million jackpot.   
Table 6 around here 
Perhaps we could conclude by a joke saying that UK players are more 
rational (or opportunistic)…but less lucky than Spanish players? 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
    The Euromillions lottery is especially well-suited for international 
comparisons at the European level since players in nine countries play the 
same game, face common rules and identical rollovers. However, players 
live in different national environments and may react differently to 
variations in the effective price of the lottery ticket. In our global analysis, 
we have shown that the very long odds of the game lead to frequent 
rollovers inducing huge variations in prices. The long-run price elasticity is 
-0.9, that is greater than -1, the level which maximizes the revenues of the 
lottery. The short-run elasticity is close to -0.6. These synthetic figures hide 
large dissimilarities across countries. More precisely, short-run elasticities 21 
 
are very low in Spain and Portugal, compared to the United Kingdom. It 
may be interpreted by referring to the regressivity of lotteries. In fact, Spain 
and Portugal have the smallest GDP of the nine countries and this could 
explain the lower sensitivity to rollovers. Moreover, the mean per capita 
sales in Portugal is  incredibly high, compared to the ones in the other 
countries; it can also explain why Portuguese players cannot afford much 
higher bets when the jackpot increases. The other interesting countries are 
Ireland and the  United Kingdom which exhibit very high long-run 
elasticities. Irish and UK players live in a highly competitive environment 
concerning the supply of lotteries and other games of chance. It is then not 
surprising to observe a low mean sales level coupled with a high sensitivity 
to jackpot increases.  We have also shown that UK players pay a lower 
effective price by being “late comers” in the game.  
Future research can be developed in several directions. At the country level, 
a study of whether national and multistate games are substitute or 
complements would deserve developments in the spirit of Forrest and 
McHale (2007) who already analyzed this question for the UK market. At 
the aggregate level, an interesting problem is the question of “free-riding”. 
If national and multistate games are complements, one can ask if it is not 
interesting for a given country to benefit from the  Euromillions  jackpot 
feeding by other countries and simultaneously to propose a national game 
with a design close to the one of the Euromillions lottery. It is the strategy 
recently adopted in France by La Française des Jeux, the French state-
owned sponsor of lotteries, who has abandoned the lotto game to propose a 
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Rank  Nums+ 
Stars 
%prize  Pgain  Rank  Nums+ 
Stars 
%prize  Pgain 
1  5+2  32%  1.31×10
-8  7  3+2  1%  1.3×10
-4 
2  5+1  7.4%  1.83×10
-7  8  3+1  5.1%  1.82×10
-3 
3  5  2.1%  2.75×10
-7  9  2+2  4.4%  1.86×10
-3 
4  4+2  1.5%  2.95×10
-6  10  3  4.7%  2.73×10
-3 
5  4+1  1%  4.13×10
-5  11  1+2  10.1%  9.8×10
-3 
6  4  0.7%  6.19×10
-5  12  2+1  24%  2.63×10
-2 
 
Table 1: Winning ranks, sharing of the pool prize and probabilities of 
gain 
 
   Weekly sales 
Country  Pop  GDP  Min  Max  ���/pop  �� � �� �
Europe  208.07  32771  18.89  139.5  39.99  0.19  18.94  0.47 
Austria   8.193  35877  0.57  7.27  1.66  0.20  0.92  0.55 
Belgium  10.379  35122  0.94  10.74  2.63  0.25  1.42  0.54 
France  61.731  33307  5.02  33.01  10.07  0.16  4.97  0.49 
Ireland  4.062  43341  0.18  3.967  0.99  0.24  0.62  0.63 
Luxembourg  0.474  66729  0.08  0.82  0.21  0.44  0.10  0.49 
Portugal  10.606  22134  3.69  30.17  9.44  0.89  3.61  0.38 
Spain  44.491  28106  5.08  18.19  7.74  0.17  2.05  0.27 
Switzerland  7.524  37847  0.67  8.45  2.04  0.27  1.07  0.52 
UK  60.609  35085  0.99  35.26  5.21  0.09  5.08  0.98 
JA        10  196.79  41.5     35.8  0.86 
JR        10  183.57  39.66     33.57  0.85 
 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for population (Pop), per capita GDP 
(GDP), weekly sales, jackpot announced (JA) and jackpot realized (JR).  
For these three variables, the statistics are the minimum, the maximum, 
the mean, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. The 
data are in millions except the coefficient of variation (without unit) and 
















Figure 1: Normalized sales as a function of the jackpot in a sequence of 
12 draws (11/18/2005 to 02/03/2006) without jackpot winners in 



















Figure 2: Normalized sales as a function of the jackpot in a sequence of 
12 draws (09/01/2006 to 11/17/2006) without jackpot winners in 











































Figure 5: Realized and estimated jackpot in a sequence of draws 
without jackpot winners 
 
  a  Standard 
deviation 
t - value 
CONSTANT  16393936***  1127672  14.36 
t  73492
***  12141  6.053 
Qt-1  0.167
***  0.02  8.353 
JAt  0.103
***  0.027  3.745 
(JAt)
2  0.202
***  0.016  12.26 
SHARE  509240  1100762  0.463 
EVENT  0.17 
***  0.025  6.882 
HALO  937832  833559  1.125 
R
2=0.966  F = 640.75
     








  β  Standard 
deviation 
t - value 
CONSTANT  11.621
***  0.423  27.47 
t  0.002
***  0.000167  13.043 
ln(Qt-1)  0.32
***  0.025  12.95 
Price   -0.609
***  0.021  -28.61 
LEVENT  0.022
***  0.003  6.69 
R²=0.949  F=745.5     




Model II: Estimation of the demand function for weekly sales. 
Independent variables are the effective price, the lagged sales, the trend 
and a dummy variable representing exceptional jackpots. 29 
 
 
  CONSTANT  t  Qt-1  ln(Pt)  EVENT  F  R²  LRE 










745  .949  -0.9 










247  .86  -0.85 










477  .923  -0.85 










287  .878  -0.91 










591  .937  -1.44 










143  .782  -0.84 










297  .882  -0.82 










183  .820  -0.49 










193  .829  -0.86 










608  .939  -1.76 
 
Table 5: Country-by-country analysis of weekly sales. Long-run 
elasticity (LRE) in the last column 30 
 
 
Country  Mean Price  Gains  Tickets  Gain/tickets 
Austria  0.88419395  0.0296465  0.04161489  0.71240124 
Belgium  0.89074091  0.07867898  0.06584925  1.19483502 
France  0.8759637  0.25980331  0.25177135  1.03190179 
Ireland  0.87640837  0.0379131  0.02480384  1.52851748 
Luxemburg  0.88582046  0.00284818  0.00524138  0.54340173 
Portugal  0.90093353  0.21553208  0.2360346  0.91313763 
Spain  0.92821258  0.19155787  0.19312543  0.99188321 
Switzerland  0.88340697  0.05648929  0.05117978  1.10374231 
UK  0.78548469  0.12753068  0.13037947  0.97815002 
 
Table 6: Mean effective prices paid by players in each country, shares 




                     
Working Papers 
 




D.R. n° 1  "Bertrand Oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale", J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 2   "Sur quelques méthodes d'estimation directe de la structure par terme des taux d'intérêt", P. Roger - N. 
Rossiensky, janvier 1994 
 
D.R. n° 3   "Towards a Monopoly Theory in a Managerial Perspective", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 4                 "Bounded Rationality in Microeconomics", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 5   "Apprentissage Théorique et Expérience Professionnelle", J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 6   "Strategic Consumers in a Duable-Goods Monopoly", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 7   "Vendre ou louer ; un apport de la théorie des jeux", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 8   "Default Risk Insurance and Incomplete Markets", Ph. Artzner - FF. Delbaen, juin 1994 
 
D.R. n° 9   "Les actions à réinvestissement optionnel du dividende", C. Marie-Jeanne - P. Roger, janvier 1995 
 
D.R. n° 10          "Forme optimale des contrats d'assurance en présence de coûts administratifs pour l'assureur", S. Spaeter, 
février  1995 
 
D.R. n° 11   "Une procédure de codage numérique des articles", J. Jeunet, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 12   "Stabilité d'un diagnostic concurrentiel fondé sur une approche markovienne du comportement de rachat 
du consommateur", N. Schall, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 13   "A direct proof of the coase conjecture", J. Thépot, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 14   "Invitation à la stratégie", J. Thépot, décembre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 15   "Charity and economic efficiency", J. Thépot, mai 1996 
 
D.R. n° 16   "Pricing anomalies in financial markets and non linear pricing rules", P. Roger, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 17   "Non linéarité des coûts de l'assureur, comportement de prudence de l'assuré et contrats optimaux", S. 
Spaeter, avril 1996 
 
D.R. n° 18   "La valeur ajoutée d'un partage de risque et l'optimum de Pareto : une note", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, juin 
1996 
 
D.R. n° 19   "Evaluation of Lot-Sizing Techniques : A robustess and Cost Effectiveness Analysis", J. Jeunet, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 20   "Entry accommodation with idle capacity", J. Thépot, septembre 1996 
 ii 
 
D.R. n° 21   "Différences culturelles et satisfaction des vendeurs : Une comparaison  internationale", E. Vauquois-
Mathevet - J.Cl. Usunier, novembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 22  "Evaluation des obligations convertibles et options d'échange", Schmitt - F. Home, décembre 1996 
 
D.R n° 23  "Réduction d'un programme d'optimisation globale des coûts et diminution du temps de calcul, J. Jeunet, 
décembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 24  "Incertitude, vérifiabilité et observabilité : Une relecture de la théorie de l'agence", J. Thépot, janvier 1997 
 
D.R. n° 25  "Financement par augmentation de capital avec asymétrie d'information :  l'apport du paiement du 
dividende en actions", C. Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 26  "Paiement du dividende en actions et théorie du signal", C. Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 27  "Risk aversion and the bid-ask spread", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, avril 1997 
 
D.R. n° 28  "De l'utilité de la contrainte d'assurance dans les modèles à un risque et à  deux risques", S. Spaeter, 
septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 29  "Robustness and cost-effectiveness of lot-sizing techniques under revised demand forecasts", J. Jeunet, 
juillet 1997 
 
D.R. n° 30  "Efficience du marché et comparaison de produits à l'aide des méthodes  d'enveloppe (Data envelopment 
analysis)", S. Chabi, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 31  "Qualités de la main-d'œuvre et subventions à l'emploi : Approche microéconomique", J. Calaza - P. Roger, 
février 1998 
 
D.R n° 32  "Probabilité de défaut et spread de taux : Etude empirique du marché français", M. Merli - P. Roger, février 
1998 
 
D.R. n° 33  "Confiance et Performance : La thèse de Fukuyama", J.Cl. Usunier - P. Roger, avril 1998 
 
D.R. n° 34  "Measuring the performance of lot-sizing techniques in uncertain environments", J. Jeunet - N. Jonard, 
janvier 1998 
 
D.R. n° 35  "Mobilité et décison de consommation : premiers résultas dans un cadre monopolistique", Ph. Lapp, 
octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 36  "Impact du paiement du dividende en actions sur le transfert de richesse et la dilution du bénéfice par 
action", C. Marie-Jeanne, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 37  "Maximum resale-price-maintenance as Nash condition", J. Thépot, novembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 38  "Properties of bid and ask prices in the rank dependent expected utility model", P. Roger, décembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 39  "Sur la structure par termes des spreads de défaut des obligations », Maxime Merli / Patrick Roger, 
septembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 40  "Le risque de défaut des obligations : un modèle de défaut temporaire de  l’émetteur", Maxime Merli, 
octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 41  "The Economics of Doping in Sports", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, février 1999 
 
D.R. n° 42  "Solving large unconstrained multilevel lot-sizing problems using a hybrid genetic algorithm", Jully Jeunet, 
mars 1999 
 
D.R n° 43  "Niveau général des taux et spreads de rendement", Maxime Merli, mars 1999 iii 
 
D.R. n° 44  "Doping in Sport and Competition Design", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, septembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 45  "Interactions dans les canaux de distribution", Jacques Thépot, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 46  "What sort of balanced scorecard for hospital", Thierry Nobre, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 47  "Le contrôle de gestion dans les PME", Thierry Nobre, mars 2000 
 
D.R. n° 48  ″Stock timing using genetic algorithms", Jerzy Korczak – Patrick Roger, avril 2000 
 
D.R. n° 49  "On the long run risk in stocks : A west-side story", Patrick Roger, mai 2000 
 
D.R. n° 50  "Estimation des coûts de transaction sur un marché gouverné par les ordres : Le cas des composantes du 
CAC40", Laurent Deville, avril 2001 
 
D.R. n° 51  "Sur une mesure d’efficience relative dans la théorie du portefeuille de Markowitz", Patrick Roger / Maxime 
Merli, septembre 2001 
 
D.R. n° 52  "Impact de l’introduction du tracker Master Share CAC 40 sur la relation de parité call-put", Laurent Deville, 
mars 2002 
 
D.R. n° 53  "Market-making, inventories and martingale pricing", Patrick Roger / Christian At / Laurent Flochel, mai 
2002 
 
D.R. n° 54  "Tarification au coût complet en concurrence imparfaite", Jean-Luc Netzer / Jacques Thépot, juillet 2002 
 
D.R. n° 55  "Is time-diversification efficient for a loss averse investor ?", Patrick Roger, janvier 2003 
 
D.R. n° 56  “Dégradations de notations du leader et effets de contagion”, Maxime Merli / Alain Schatt, avril 2003 
 
D.R. n° 57  “Subjective evaluation, ambiguity and relational contracts”, Brigitte Godbillon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 58  “A View of the European Union as an Evolving Country Portfolio”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, 
juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 59  “Can Mergers in Europe Help Banks Hedge Against Macroeconomic Risk ?”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon / 
Laurent Weill, septembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 60  “Monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric wage indexation”, Giuseppe Diana / Pierre-Guillaume 
Méon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 61  “Concurrence bancaire et taille des conventions de services”, Corentine Le Roy, novembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 62  “Le petit monde du CAC 40”, Sylvie Chabi / Jérôme Maati 
 
D.R. n° 63  “Are Athletes Different ? An Experimental Study Based on the Ultimatum Game”, Nicolas Eber /  Marc 
Willinger 
 
D.R. n° 64  “Le rôle de l’environnement réglementaire, légal et institutionnel dans la défaillance des banques : Le cas 
des pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, janvier 2004 
 
D.R. n° 65  “Etude de la cohérence des ratings de banques avec la probabilité de défaillance bancaire dans les pays 
émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, Mars 2004 
 
D.R. n° 66  “Le comportement des étudiants sur le marché du téléphone mobile : Inertie, captivité ou fidélité ?”, 
Corentine Le Roy, Mai 2004 
 




D.R. n° 68  “On the Backwardness in Macroeconomic Performance of European Socialist Economies”, Laurent Weill, 
September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 69  “Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its 
members”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon, September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 70  “Modélisation de la prévision de défaillance de la banque : Une application aux banques des pays 
émergents”, Christophe J. Godlewski, octobre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 71  “Can bankruptcy law discriminate between heterogeneous firms when information is incomplete ? The case 
of legal sanctions”, Régis Blazy, october 2004 
 
D.R. n° 72  “La performance économique et financière des jeunes entreprises”, Régis Blazy/Bertrand Chopard, octobre 
2004 
 
D.R. n° 73  “Ex Post Efficiency of bankruptcy procedures : A general normative framework”, Régis Blazy / Bertrand 
Chopard, novembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 74  “Full cost pricing and organizational structure”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 75  “Prices as strategic substitutes in the Hotelling duopoly”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 76  “Réflexions sur l’extension récente de la statistique de prix et de production à la santé et à l’enseignement”, 
Damien Broussolle, mars 2005 
 
D. R. n° 77  “Gestion du risque de crédit dans la banque : Information hard, information soft et manipulation ”, Brigitte 
Godbillon-Camus / Christophe J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 78   “Which Optimal Design For LLDAs”, Marie Pfiffelmann 
 
D.R. n° 79  “Jensen and Meckling 30 years after : A game theoretic view”, Jacques Thépot 
 
D.R. n° 80  “Organisation artistique et dépendance à l’égard des ressources”, Odile Paulus, novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 81  “Does collateral help mitigate adverse selection ? A cross-country analysis”, Laurent Weill –Christophe J. 
Godlewski, novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 82  “Why do banks ask for collateral and which ones ?”, Régis Blazy - Laurent Weill, décembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 83  “The peace of work agreement : The emergence and enforcement of a swiss labour market institution”, D. 
Broussolle, janvier 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 84  “The new approach to international trade in services in view of services specificities : Economic and 
regulation issues”, D. Broussolle, septembre 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 85  “Does the consciousness of the disposition effect increase the equity premium” ?, P. Roger, juin 2007 
 
D.R. n° 86  “Les déterminants de la décision de syndication bancaire en France”, Ch. J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 87  “Syndicated loans in emerging markets”, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, mars 2007 
 
D.R. n° 88  “Hawks and loves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness”, Claude 
d’Aspremont / R. Dos Santos Ferreira / J. Thépot, mai 2007 
 
D.R. n° 89  “On the optimality of the full cost pricing”, J. Thépot, février 2007 
 
D.R. n° 90  “SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure : Evidence from France”, H. El Hajj Chehade / L. 
Vigneron, octobre 2007 v 
 
   
D.R n° 91  “How to solve St Petersburg Paradox in Rank-Dependent Models” ?, M. Pfiffelmann, octobre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 92  “Full market opening in the postal services facing the social and territorial cohesion goal in France”, D. 
Broussolle, novembre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 2008-01     A behavioural Approach to financial puzzles, M.H. Broihanne, M. Merli,  
P. Roger, janvier 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-02    What drives the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndication ?, Ch. J. Godlewski, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-03    Financial intermediation and macroeconomic efficiency, Y. Kuhry, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-04   The effects of concentration on competition and efficiency : Some evidence from the french audit 
market, G. Broye, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-05   Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic efficiency?, P.G. Méon, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-06   Is corruption an efficient grease ?, P.G. Méon, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-07  Convergence in banking efficiency across european countries, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-08  Banking environment, agency costs, and loan syndication : A cross-country analysis, Ch. J. Godlewski, 
mars 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-09  Are French individual investors reluctant to realize their losses ?, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh / M.H. Broihanne / 
M. Merli, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-10  Collateral and adverse selection in transition countries, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-11  How many banks does it take to lend ? Empirical evidence from Europe, Ch. J. Godlewski, avril 2008. 
 
D.R. n° 2008-12  Un portrait de l’investisseur individuel français, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-13   La déclaration de mission, une revue de la littérature, Odile Paulus, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-14   Performance et risque des entreprises appartenant à des groupes de PME, Anaïs Hamelin, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-15  Are private banks more efficient than public banks ? Evidence from Russia,   Alexei Karas / Koen 
Schoors / Laurent Weill, septembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-16  Capital protected notes for loss averse investors : A counterintuitive result, Patrick Roger, septembre 
2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-17  Mixed risk aversion and preference for risk disaggregation, Patrick Roger, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-18   Que peut-on attendre de la directive services ?, Damien Broussolle, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-19  Bank competition and collateral : Theory and Evidence, Christa Hainz / Laurent Weill  / Christophe J. 
Godlewski, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-20  Duration of syndication process and syndicate organization, Ch. J. Godlewski, novembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-21  How corruption affects bank lending in Russia, L. Weill, novembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-22  On several economic consequences of the full market opening in the postal service in the European 




D.R. n° 2009-01  Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, Z. 
Fungacova, C.J. Godlewski, L. Weill 
D.R. n° 2009-02  Do Islamic Banks Have Greater Market Power ?, L. Weill 
D.R. n° 2009-03  CEO Compensation: Too Much is not Enough!, N. Couderc & L. Weill 
D.R. n° 2009-04  La cannibalisation des produits à prix aléatoires : L’Euromillions a-t-il tué le loto français?, 
P. Roger & S. Chabi 
D.R. n° 2009-05  The demand for Euromillions lottery tickets: An international comparison, P. Roger 
 
 
 
 
 